My reply to Dr. Novella: part 1

Steven Novella has replied to my criticism of his post on the materiality/immateriality of the mind. I've already replied to one of the points he made in the post. I'll reply here in a more comprehensive fashion to the first part of his most recent post.

Briefly, for background, Dr. Novella believes that the mind can be explained entirely in a materialist framework. He's always been vague about what he means by 'materialism', a necessary stance because materialism, carefully explained, is absurd, and explains nothing. Imprecision is a prerequisite for a materialist who isn't doing stand-up comedy.  

Novella claims:

The materialist hypothesis— that the brain causes consciousness — has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated...

This would of course make Novella's "materialist hypothesis" more completely validated than any theory in science. Not even general relativity or quantum theory has had 'every single prediction validated'. This is the sort of claim that one expects from a guy in a white coat in an infomercial selling weight-loss pills, not from a scientist. He doesn't make any claims about the logic of his claim, understandably. But he seems to imply that supplies of his theory are running out and you should order now.

These are his 'completely validated' predictions:

If the brain causes mind, then:

1- Brain states will correlate to mental and behavioral states.

2- Brain maturity will correlate with mental and emotional maturity.

3- Changing the brain’s function (with drugs, electrical or magnetic stimulation, or other methods) will change mental function.

4- Damaging the brain with damage the mind – producing specific deficits that correlate to the area of the brain damaged.

5- There will be no documentable mental phenomena in the absence of brain function.

6- When the brain dies, mental function ends.

I replied:

1) The mind-brain controversy is a philosophical question, not an empirical question. Empirical findings can be interpreted in any number of ways.

2) Novella's criteria are poorly formulated. 

3) To the extent that the questions are coherent, the evidence strongly favors the inference that some aspects of mind are immaterial. 

I discussed each 'prediction' in turn, reviewed the neuroscience, and showed that immateriality of some aspects of mental function was a reasonable inference for each prediction.

Novella made some odd assertions:

Three through six are specific to the brain causes mind hypothesis and are not predicted by the mind causes brain hypothesis. 

"Mind causes brain hypothesis"? The last major philosopher to make that claim was idealist George Berkeley in the 18th century. No one today claims that the mind 'causes' the brain.

Novella again:

There are now countless experiments and cases in which it is clearly demonstrated that doing something to the brain reliably results in a change of the mind. The arrow of causation is clear.

This had nothing to do with an "arrow of causation". It has to do with the materialist claim that the mind is the brain, without remainder. The evidence thus far suggests that the "remainder" is huge, and no reasonable interpretation of the science supports strict materialism. Now it may turnout that the "remainder" will be reduced to nothing with future research, and perhaps it will remain, and perhaps it will grow. But it's crazy to assert that current neuroscience proves materialism.

Here is Dr. Novella's reply to my post, with my commentary:

The Motivated Reasoning of Egnorance

Published by Steven Novella under Neuroscience

If you want to see many examples of motivated reasoning, pay a visit to Michael Egnor’s blog, Egnorance. He’s the evolution-denying neurosurgeon that I have sparred with over the last few years, mostly about evolution and dualism. Motivated reasoning is what most people do most of the time – start with a desired conclusion and then find reasons to support it (human are very good at that).

"Motivated reasoning" is the latest materialist trope ("denialism" is getting stale). Novella's implication is that he is objective and I am a prisoner of dogma. Novella apparently believes that the assertion that every single prediction of materialism has been validated by neuroscience is free of materialist dogma, and that materialist hubris isn't a paradigm of "motivated reasoning". Materialists can be quite funny.

However, the whole point of philosophy is to rise above this tendency and follow strict rules of logic, while the point of science is similar but also to follow the evidence.

Materialism provides no basis for 'strict rules of logic'. 'Atoms in motion' is all, sorry. It's funny when a dogmatic materialist invokes an immaterial principle like logic. Novella's most potent critic is himself.

Here's my punchy aphorism for materialists: 'If you can't weigh it, you can't say it.'

Egnor can’t seem to do either, as he rants against non-believers, misinterprets study after study, and attacks those who do not share his particular faith.

I challenge people who talk nonsense. I challenge 'neuroscientists' like Novella who misuse neuroscience and assert that neuroscience proves their materialist faith.

...The materialist theory of mind is not my theory – it is the overwhelming consensus of neuroscientists and the result of over a century of research.

The materialist theories of the mind (there are several), beginning with behaviorism in the early 20th century and regressing progressing to identity theory and eliminative materialism, are philosophical theories, not empirical theories, and they are very much on the wane. Most leading philosophers of the mind-- Nagel, Chalmers, Searle, Fodor, Putnam, Anscombe-- consider strict materialism to be a transparent error.

Neuroscientists, who professionally study the material brain, are generally uninformed about the genuine philosophical issues and have nothing meaningful to contribute to the debate. Dr. Novella would be an example.

But Egnor would have his readers believe it is my own quirky “bizarre” theory.

Materialism is quirky and bizarre, but not Novella's theory alone. Point granted.

This is, of course, nonsense. It is Egnor who is out on the fringe of neuroscience with his antiquated dualist beliefs. But far more important are the actual arguments themselves (I make this point mainly to demonstrate how Egnor constantly rewrites reality).

Some of the leading neuroscientists of the 20th century-- Sherrington, Penfield, Eccles, Libet-- were dualists.

In our previous discussions I outlined six lines of evidence that clearly establish that the mind is what the brain does – the most parsimonious interpretation of all available evidence is that the mind is a manifestation of the brain.

It's always good in chess to leave your own king a way out of check. This is what Novella's up to here: he asserts that the "mind is a manifestation of the brain". What does he mean by "manifestation"? Property dualists believe that the mind is a property-- a manifestation-- of the brain. Does Novella admit that intellect and will are immaterial manifestations of the brain? Then he's a property dualist. Does he believe that the intellect and will are material manifestations of the brain? Then he's an identity theorist. Does he believe that the mind is just an epiphenomenon of the brain, with no casual power of its own? Then he embraces epiphenomenalism, which is a form of dualism. Does he believe that the brain is all that really exists, and the 'mind' is just folk-wisdom without genuine meaning? Then he's an eliminative materialist. Does he believe that the mind bears the same relation to the brain as form bears to matter? Then he's a Thomistic dualist.

"[T]he mind is a manifestation of the brain". Novella hides behind imprecision.

Egnor, however, would rather believe that there is something magical to the mind that cannot be explained by the matter of the brain, and so the motivated reasoning ensues.

The mind isn't magical. It bears a quite natural relation the the brain, but it can't be explained via materialist metaphysics. I believe that Thomistic dualism provides the best model for the mind-brain relationship. I'll elaborate in future posts.

I am not a Cartesian (substance) dualist, which I believe is almost as problematic a view as materialism.

My first line of evidence (a prediction made by the materialist hypothesis) is that brain states will correlate with mental and behavioral states, to which Egnor responds:

[Egnor] We can’t scan you and tell what you’re thinking, no matter how we image your brain. Period.

His point is that the correlation between brain activity and mental states is “very loose”. I have already addressed this issue – Egnor is failing to account for the limitations in our current technology.

It's the limitations of your theory, Steve, not the "limitations in our current technology".

Novella made a prediction, and he admits that the evidence doesn't support it, which is exactly what I pointed out. He blames the failure of his prediction on "current technology". Promissory materialism: 'we have no evidence for materialism, but you must keep quiet and just wait..."

I never claimed that we could look at the brain and tell what someone is thinking.

Novella claimed: "1- Brain states will correlate to mental and behavioral states."

I pointed out that we have not a single correlation between a brain state and a mental state. Not. One. We have measured countless brain states (EEG, CT, MRI, fMRI), and we experience countless mental states. Never has a specific correlation between a brain state (a specific EEG, CT, MRI, fMRI finding)  and a mental state (a specific thought) been established. The only correlation of any sort is very vague: thinking anything will change EEG and fMRI subtly sometimes. Nothing even resembling a 1:1 correlation between any brain and any mind state.

If materialism is true, then every mind state must correlate exactly with a brain state, because according to materialism matter is all that there is.

The neuroscientific evidence in no way supports such a wild assertion.

We do not yet have a detailed enough model of the brain nor the ability to measure brain activity with sufficient resolution or calibration to come anywhere near such a task. Neither is that necessary for my argument to be valid.

"We do not yet ... come anywhere near such a task." That's my point, Steve. How then can you claim that

"The materialist hypothesis... has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated..."

and

 "There are now countless experiments and cases in which it is clearly demonstrated that doing something to the brain reliably results in a change of the mind."

and then admit:

 "We do not yet ... come anywhere near such a task."

Novella refutes himself, which saves me time. But he keeps trying:

The point is – to the extent that we are able to visualize brain activity, it correlates nicely with mental activity, within the resolution of our instruments.

Some of our instruments have enormous resolution.  Depth electrodes (a form of brain wave EEG measurement) can record electrical activity in tiny groups of neurons. Never has there been a reproducible correlation between a specific thought and a specific EEG tracing. Never.

Novella:

This has held up with better tools, like fMRI. We can correlate activity in different brain regions with different types of mental activity. 

 But Novella just said:

"We do not yet have a detailed enough model of the brain nor the ability to measure brain activity with sufficient resolution or calibration to come anywhere near such a task."

It's like Gollum/Smaegol. Novella contradicts himself in mid-post: 'Every single prediction of materialism is proven...we do not come anywhere near such a task..."

!

Novella:

The materialist hypothesis of the mind further predicts that as our technology and model of the brain improve, this correlation will hold up. It has so far.

Actually, there has never been a correlation between a specific thought and specific brain anatomy or activity. After a century of neuroscience. It is a gaping hole in the materialist superstition, and Novella is hoping you won't notice. He asserts complete brain-mind correlation (and causation!), and then admits that "we do not come anywhere near such a task".

One or the other, Steve. Promises don't count.

In other words, Egnor is confusing the limitations of our resolution to see brain-mind correlation with evidence for a lack of correlation. These are not the same thing.

I'm not confusing anything, Steve. The limitations are in your theory. After a century of neuroscience you can't point to a single specific thought-brain correlation, let alone causation. Your own arguments are self-refuting. You make unhinged claims about the data ("every single prediction.."), and then admit the inadequacy of the data ("We do not... come anywhere near such a task".)

This is my view: the best interpretation of the neuroscientific evidence is Thomistic dualism. Lower functions (reflexes, motor control, etc) correlate quite well with brain anatomy and physiology. Higher functions-- intellect, judgement, will-- are immaterial and correlate poorly with brain anatomy and physiology. That is a specific prediction of Thomistic dualism, and it correlates nicely with a century of neuroscience.

Novella's dogmatic materialism-- "every single prediction..." is self-contradictory unscientific gibberish.

More to come...