Friday, May 4, 2012

John Gray on scientism and evolutionary explanations of morality

John Gray at The New Republic has a devastating book review in which he disassembles scientism and risible efforts to explain morality scientifically.

Excerpt:
The belief that the political conflicts of the day can be resolved by applying evolutionary psychology is no more wellfounded than the claims of earlier versions of scientism that invoked phrenology or dialectical materialism. No doubt human knowledge has increased since the days when those pseudo-sciences were in the ascendant. Certainly we know a good deal more about human origins, and about the workings of the human brain, than we did then. But we are no better equipped to deal with moral and political conflict. Intellectually, we may be less well prepared than previous generations, if only because we know less of our own history.

Scientism has been shown to be an illusion time and time again. But it is another illusion to imagine that scientism will go away. Looking to science for deliverance from the tragicomedy of history is part of what it means to be modern. The tracts that come and go in airport bookstores, promising solutions to problems that have baffled the greatest minds, are symptoms of a confusion that is incurable. We may expect many more books that offer to extricate us from conflict by sprinkling the magic dust of science on our disorders.
Scientism is coming under withering attack from many quarters, finally. It will shrivel, as have other idiot ideologies like positivism, but the intellectual rot will linger for generations. Stupidity of this magnitude causes serious and lasting damage to intellectual discourse.

Scientism as "tragicomedy". Gets to the heart of it.

Thursday, May 3, 2012

Opponent of Chinese One Child Policy dumped at the roadside by Obama administration



The Chinese dissident who has been punished by the Chinese government for his opposition to China's One Child Policy-- a population control scheme which includes forced sterilizations and abortions-- has gotten less than enthusiastic support from the Obama Administration. Chen Guangcheng has been released/turned over to Chinese authorities for "hospitalization".

Mr. Chen is a courageous man who has worked hard to oppose population control, which is an ongoing crime against humanity. The United Nations and the International Criminal Court have defined as genocide:

"... the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such... Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group"

Mr. Chen's work in support of this basic human right-- the right to be free from government control of family size-- has gotten little sympathy from the Obama administration. Perhaps he could stir up passion from the left by abandoning his struggle against population control totalitarianism and instead demand that he receive free contraception.

Free condoms, rather than human dignity, seems to be what the left is willing to fight for. 

George Will on the blessings of his son Jon



A beautiful essay by George Will about his son Jon, who loves baseball and life and recently turned 40.

Jon has Down's syndrome. Will has written frequently about the blessings that Jon has brought to his family.

Will writes frankly about the things that Jon cannot do. But Jon's personal gift, Will notes, is serenity. This is something I have seen again and again in patients and family and friends with Down's syndrome. They have a preternatural serenity, an essential joyfulness. It is a kind of wisdom, a wisdom about what really matters in life. Those of us without disabilities have much to learn from our friends and loved ones with disabilities.

May Jon have many blessings and many more happy birthdays. 

God's simplicity

Commentor KW replies to my discussion of the cosmological proof and the notion of the simplicity of God:

[Egnor] “Aquinas showed rigorously that the only thing that can be the cause of its own existence is an entity in which essence (what it is) and existence (that it is) are identical. He also showed that it must be simple (without parts) and pure actually, without potentiality.
[KW] How simple? It seems to me that all religions rely on a fairly complicated God or Gods. I don’t see how a God that necessarily underpins all of existence as a constant causal force while maintaining an intellect and relationships with his creations can be simple. How does something without parts have a thought? Of course if something has no parts, then there can be no change of relationship between those parts, and thus no potential for thought or purposeful action.
KW asks very good questions. A refreshing shift from intellectual nihlism.

The notion of metaphysical simplicity is fiendishly subtle, and transcends what we generally mean by "simplicity". Scholastic philosopher Bernard Boedder. S.J. from the Jacques Maritain Center provides a synopsis:
... God is not only physically simple, but also metaphysically. As physical simplicity excludes physical composition, so metaphysical simplicity excludes metaphysical composition. The difference between physical (real) and metaphysical (virtual) composition may be thus expressed: Physical composition means union of diverse realities completing one another to constitute one really existing being, as for instance, man is a physical compound of body and soul; metaphysical composition means union of diverse concepts referring to the same real being in such a way that none of them by itself signifies either explicitly or even implicitly the whole reality signified by their combination; man, for instance, is a metaphysical compound of animal and rational. This metaphysical composition belongs to all creatures, even to such as are physically simple. The reason for this assertion is obvious enough. That which is signified by the definition of a created thing, its essence as we call it, depends for its existence, not upon itself, but upon its creating cause. Without the influx of the creating power of God the creature is nothing but an objective idea of the Divine Mind, something known only as capable of existing under the condition that God wills its existence. In other words, the essence of every creature is in itself a mere possibility; not a real, but a conditional existence. In conceiving its essence, or the contents of its definition, we thereby neither express nor imply its existence. Consequently the objective concept of the real existence of a creature is metaphysically compounded of the two concepts of its essence and existence. That this first kind of metaphysical composition cannot be predicated of God is evident; for its only foundation is the contingency of created being; therefore it must be alien to the Divine Nature, which exists with absolute necessity.
... any conceivable sort of metaphysical compositions are all inapplicable to God. The general reason for this may be stated thus: Concepts which in their application to objective reality are absolutely inseparable, so that none of them can have a real foundation different from the real foundation of the rest, cannot be metaphysically compounded. For though none expresses what is expressed by the others, yet each of them implies all the rest. But the concepts which we form of the Divine attributes are in their application to objective reality absolutely inseparable. Each of the Divine attributes in its objective reality coincides with the one self-existing Divine substance, which we have proved to be a simple unchangeable essence. Consequently none of the Divine attributes has any objective foundation except in so far as it is one with the rest; which is evidently the same as to say that the Divine attributes are absolutely inseparable in their application to objective reality. Divine justice, for instance, without Divine mercy is impossible; and so is Divine power without Divine wisdom. Therefore these attributes are not metaphysically compounded, although they must be said to be metaphysically or virtually distinct; the concept of justice does not express what is expressed by the concept of mercy, although it implies the same.
So one might ask: what about the Trinity? Isn't that a metaphysical composition, a composition of three Persons in one Essence?

Fr. Boedder:
Real distinction does not necessarily mean real composition, nor does virtual distinction necessarily mean virtual composition. For things to be compounded they must first be distinct; but, given the existence of distinct things, it is not necessary that they should be compounded together into a unity. Catholic Theology recognizes a real distinction between the three Divine Persons, because They are, as "substantial" relations within the One Godhead, opposed to one another; but it is not constrained in consequence to admit that the Godhead is really compounded of Them, because it teaches that each Person is not really distinct from, but really identical with, the Essence of the Divinity. Again, Catholic Theology recognizes a virtual distinction between the Divine Essence and each Divine Person, but it does not teach us that the Divine Essence is virtually compounded of the three Persons, because the concept of each Divine Person does not prescind from, but involves the concept of the Divine Essence. These observations show us that the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is opposed neither to the physical nor to the metaphysical simplicity of God.
A composition is a substance made of parts each of which is less than the whole. A simple substance has no composition.

Metaphysical simplicity entails no composition-- it admits no components each of which is less than the whole-- but admits distinction and relation. A metaphysically simple thing is not compounded, but it can have relations and distinctions within it, although each distinction is identical with the essence of the simple whole.

But how can something have distinctions and relations within it, but still have each distinction identical to the whole? I will hazard an analogy (whenever a layman tries to explain the Trinity, it is a hazard!).

Imagine when I think about myself. There is the "I" that thinks, and the "Myself" that is thought about. I think about Myself. Yet I am not composed of two selves-- an I and a Myself. I am one self, not two, even when I think about myself. I do not make myself into four selves by thinking about thinking about thinking about myself. Yet I can make a distinction between the subject "I" of my thought and the object "Myself" of my thought. Yet they are the same self. There is no composition-- each is fully me. The difference between I and Myself is one of relation-- one is the subject of my thought, the other is the object of my thought. Yet each and both are fully me, without composition.

This analogy is one of the analogies used by theologians to explain the Trinity. God is Love, and Love entails relations. Love exists within God, and can be expressed by God to His creation. The Son is the Father's contemplation of Himself, and the Holy Spirit is the Love exchanged between the Father and the Son.

God is Love, and the Trinity is the eternal Act of Love.

By the very crude analogy of "I think about myself", one can get a glimpse of how the Trinity can be three Persons in one Essence, metaphysically simple, yet with relations.

Metaphysical simplicity is sublime, and means something quite beyond what we mean by "simplicity" in everyday language. It is a detailed and very rigorous metaphysical understanding that cannot be reduced to colloquialisms.

It of course admits debate-- one can disagree about metaphysical simplicity. Philosophers and theologians do disagree, often passionately, and with sublime arguments.

But it is no argument to invoke mundane definitions of "simplicity" applicable to everyday life to refer to the metaphysical argument. One does not refute quantum mechanics by arguing that Schrodinger's Equation (which contains the letters E, H and Psi) can't be true because letters don't exist in atoms. One does not refute the metaphysical simplicity of God by arguing that a really smart and powerful God couldn't be simple.

One must understand the relevant science and terminology to argue coherently. This applies to people who misunderstand metaphysics as well as to people who misunderstand science. If you want to provide answers, learn the language and understand the questions.

Back to KW:
It’s far less problematic to imagine that quantum systems boot-strap themselves into existence by their very quantum nature, and that at least one such self contained quantum fluctuation contained an inflation field resulting in a flat universe full of matter and gravity with zero net energy.

"Boot-strap themselves into existence" is a colloquial way of saying "cause their own existence". The impossibility of self-causation of existence for a natural thing is well demonstrated in classical philosophy. A thing cannot be prior-- in a causual (not necessarily temporal) chain-- to itself. In ordinary language, something cannot cause itself-- 'bootstrap itself'-- because it would have to exist in order to cause itself to exist, which is nonsense.

A quantum field can be said (loosely) to cause all kinds of things-- particles, a universe, etc. But it cannot be said, even loosely, to cause itself.

To assert that a thing in nature is its own cause of existence is to deny logic-- to substitute nonsense for an argument.

However, even if one could make that assertion credibly-- that something can cause itself-- it would entail denial of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which is the assertion that everything that exists has a reason sufficient to explain its existence. This is the foundation for all logic and science. If things could cause themselves, then one could easily deny evolution-- organisms didn't evolve; each living thing just caused itself. One could deny all social conventions-- 'I didn't fire that bullet that killed the guy; the bullet wound caused itself'. The denial of the PSR is the denial of science and the possiblity of any logic in life.

That atheists are willing to deny the PSR in order to evade God's existence is evidence of their desperation.

It’s far more reasonable and potentially far more scientifically fruitful to assume that quantum systems can generate themselves that it is to posit the existence of a really not so simple omnipotent, omniscient, eternal being.
A quantum field can't cause itself.
The cosmologists and physicists who have made this a truly remarkable time in our understanding of the universe will, thankfully, simply continue to ignore medieval metaphysical bullshit.
KW argues that things cause themselves and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is invalid, and yet he accuses those who insist on logic and reason of perpetuating "medieval metaphysical bullshit".

Yet KW's arguments are entirely metaphysical as well, and of an ancient lineage (such arguments are what Aristotle and Aquinas and countless classical philosophers were refuting.)  That KW is reduced to insult and incoherence is even more evidence of the power of the classical arguments.

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

Can you pick out the minority person?

Commentor KT Cat directs us to a great blog-- Secular Apostate. This post is very clever.

Cal Thomas on requiring pre-natal ultrasound as part of abortion counseling




Cal Thomas has a good post on a judge's injunction in support of the ACLU's lawsuit to block North Carolina's quite reasonable effort to require pre-natal ultrasound prior to an abortion, to show the mother just what who is in her womb.

Thomas:
So what's the objection to orally and visually disclosing to a woman seeking an abortion what's inside her womb? Judge Eagles' decision, and the rationale behind it, is unabashedly political. How can more speech containing factual information violate the First Amendment, which is all about protecting, not restricting, speech?

The only way abortion can remain common is if women remain ignorant of what abortion really is. The ultrasound requirement is good medicine and indispensible for informed consent to a procedure that isn't successful unless it kills a child.

Tuesday, May 1, 2012

Feser on atheists and the cosmological argument

Philosopher Ed Feser has a great post on the fallacies that atheists invoke in their efforts to refute the cosmological argument. Feser, a superb Thomist philosopher, got into a blog debate with several New Atheists, including Jerry Coyne and Jason Rosenhouse. Needless to say, the New Atheists were outnumbered by Feser. New Atheist literacy in philosophy and even rudimentary logic is pitiful, and nowhere is that illiteracy more obvious than in their juvenile tilting at the cosmological argument for the existence of God.

I've posted on Aquinas' First Way, which is one version of the cosmological argument. All versions of the cosmological argument assert the impossibility of infinite regress in an essentially ordered series of causes (the terminology may be unfamiliar; I explain it in detail in my post linked above).

Feser notes:

Most people who comment on the cosmological argument demonstrably do not know what they are talking about. This includes all the prominent New Atheist writers. It very definitely includes most of the people who hang out in Jerry Coyne’s comboxes. It also includes most scientists. And it even includes many theologians and philosophers, or at least those who have not devoted much study to the issue.
...
I’m not going to present and defend any version of the cosmological argument here. I’ve done that at length in my books Aquinas and The Last Superstition, and it needs to be done at length rather than in the context of a blog post. The reason is that, while the basic structure of the main versions of the argument is fairly simple, the background metaphysics necessary to a proper understanding of the key terms and inferences is not. It needs some spelling out, which is why Aquinasand The Last Superstition each devote a long chapter to general metaphysics before addressing the question of God’s existence. The serious objections to the argument can in my view all be answered, but that too can properly be done only after the background ideas have been set out. And that too is a task carried out in the books.
I will deal here with some of the non-serious objections, though. In particular, what follows is intended to clear away some of the intellectual rubbish that prevents many people from giving the argument a fair hearing. To get to the point(s), then:

1. The argument does NOT rest on the premise that “Everything has a cause.”
Lots of people – probably most people who have an opinion on the matter – think that the cosmological argument goes like this: Everything has a cause; so the universe has a cause; so God exists. They then have no trouble at all poking holes in it. If everything has a cause, then what caused God? Why assume in the first place that everything has to have a cause? Why assume the cause is God? Etc.
Here’s the funny thing, though. People who attack this argument never tell you where they got it from. They never quote anyone defending it. There’s a reason for that. The reason is that none of the best-known proponents of the cosmological argument in the history of philosophy and theology ever gave this stupid argument. Not Plato, not Aristotle, not al-Ghazali, not Maimonides, not Aquinas, not Duns Scotus, not Leibniz, not Samuel Clarke, not Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, not Mortimer Adler, not William Lane Craig, not Richard Swinburne. And not anyone else either, as far as I know. (Your Pastor Bob doesn’t count. I mean no one among prominent philosophers.) And yet it is constantly presented, not only by popular writers but even by some professional philosophers, as if it were “the” “basic” version of the cosmological argument, and as if every other version were essentially just a variation on it.
... 
[T]his procedure is intellectually dishonest and sleazy, but it is rhetorically very effective. It gives the unwary reader the false impression that “the basic” claim made by Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, et al. is manifestly absurd, that everything else they have to say is merely an attempt to patch up this absurd position, and (therefore) that such writers need not be bothered with further.
And that, I submit, is the reason why the stupid “Everything has a cause” argument – a complete fabrication, an urban legend, something no philosopher has ever defended – perpetually haunts the debate over the cosmological argument. It gives atheists an easy target, and a way rhetorically to make even their most sophisticated opponents seem silly and not worth bothering with. It‘s a slimy debating trick, nothing more – a shameless exercise in what I have elsewhere called “meta-sophistry.” (I make no judgment about whether Le Poidevin’s or Dennett’s sleaziness was deliberate. But that they should know better is beyond question.)
What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause, or that what is contingent has a cause. These claims are as different from “Everything has a cause” as “Whatever has color is extended” is different from “Everything is extended.” Defenders of the cosmological argument also providearguments for these claims about causation. You may disagree with the claims – though if you think they are falsified by modern physics,you are sorely mistaken – but you cannot justly accuse the defender of the cosmological argument either of saying something manifestly silly or of contradicting himself when he goes on to say that God is uncaused.
This gives us what I regard as “the basic” test for determining whether an atheist is informed and intellectually honest. If he thinks that the cosmological argument rests on the claim that “everything has a cause,” then he is simply ignorant of the basic facts. If he persists in asserting that it rests on this claim after being informed otherwise, then he is intellectually dishonest. And if he is an academic philosopher like Le Poidevin or Dennett who is professionally obligated to know these things and to eschew cheap debating tricks, then… well, you do the math.

When I was becoming a Christian, I secretly feared reading debates about God's existence. I feared that my growing faith would be shattered by some obvious logical flaw in theist arguments. I began to read, with trepidation, Christian vrs. atheist debates ( my first was Does God Exist? The Great Debate. by J.P. Moreland, Kai Nielsen and others).

I was astonished. The atheist arguments, rather than presenting formidable challenges to belief in God, were.. pitiful. The Christian arguments were well-structured logical demonstrations, basically rigorous extensions of common sense. The atheist arguments were tangential, ad hoc, absurd ('the universe caused itself', 'everything came from nothing'). The best the atheists could do is play semantic games. In Does God Exist, the most capable atheist philosopher, Kai Nielsen, merely argued that 'God' was undefinable, and therefore arguments for His existence were nonsensical. That's the best he could do.

As I've studied the arguments, my disdain for atheist arguments has grown exponentially. None of the New Atheist 'intellectuals' has presented an argument against God's existence that would get a passing grade in a freshman philosophy course.

Bottom line: read good philosophers like Feser and Craig and Moreland, and you'll see that reason and logic are Christian virtues, not atheist virtues. Atheist illiteracy on even rudimentary philosophical issues is astonishing.

I'll post more on Feser and the cosmological argument.